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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A.

Issue

International piracy has become a lucrative business, with a total revenue to pirates
operating off the coast of Somalia estimated to be anywhere between US$75-238 million in
2010. As of 2011, an estimated total of US$500-600 million has been paid in ransom.
Commensurate with the increasing bounty, the incidents of piracy have increased significantly
over the past few years: from 276 in 2005 to 445 in 2010, with total incidents expected to exceed
600 by 2015. In order to counter this trend, many law enforcement authorities have concluded
that the economic incentive system behind the piracy business must be disrupted.
In January 2012, James Michel, President of the Republic of the Seychelles, stated, “[w]e
can fill our prisons to the brim with the Somali pirates who are at sea, but they are not the
instigators, they are not earning even a drop of the vast amounts of money from the ransoms, so
our efforts to capture them will not be efficient, in the overall picture, if we do not capture those
who profit the most from this criminal activity.”1 Therefore, as suggested by President Michel,
prosecuting piracy financiers may be one of the most effective means of combating piracy.
This memorandum provides recommendations for ways in which the Seychelles Penal
Code may be amended to support the prosecution of financiers of piracy who reside outside of
the Seychelles. Section II of this memorandum provides an overview of the sources used to
finance piracy and the transmission of monies collected in successful attacks. Section III. A
reviews recent changes to the Seychelles Penal Code to allow for universal jurisdiction over acts
of piracy as well as inchoate acts of attempt and conspiracy. Section III.B reviews the
jurisdictional bases that may be used to support the prosecution of financiers of piracy who
1

Seychelles President: Don’t Manage the Piracy Problem, Solve It: Interview with H.E. James Michel,
President of the Republic of Seychelles, DEF.PRO. (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/946/print/?SID=e34f0b1fc1a77c6467fa9353923f1547.

1

reside outside the Seychelles. Section III.C contains an overview of the concept of universal
jurisdiction and concludes that it likely cannot provide a basis for the prosecution of financing of
piracy under international law. Section III.D examines other bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
and provides recommendations for their use in a proposed jurisdictional provision governing the
financing of piracy. Section III.E provides recommendations for how the Seychelles Penal Code
may be amended to prosecute financiers of piracy who reside outside the Seychelles. Finally,
Section III.F discusses the extradition process that will enable prosecutors to enforce the
amended provisions of the Seychelles Penal Code.
B.

Summary of Conclusions

The recently amended provisions of Section 65 of the Seychelles Penal Code provide for
stricter penalties for the commission of acts of piracy and punish inchoate acts of piracy. Under
these new provisions, universal jurisdiction has been granted to prosecute suspected pirates for
completed and inchoate acts of piracy.
While these recent provisions may be broad enough to encompass the financing of
piracy, the current Penal Code provision likely cannot be used to extradite and prosecute nonnationals who reside outside the Seychelles. Given that universal jurisdiction has been
interpreted narrowly in recent international court decisions, the Penal Code’s existing grant of
universal jurisdiction most likely cannot be used to support the prosecution of financiers of
piracy who reside outside the Seychelles.
Rather, alternate bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction that require the existence of some
link between the suspect and the Seychelles may be accepted as a basis for extradition and
prosecution of non-nationals to the Seychelles for the financing and material support of piracy.
A review of extraterritorial jurisdiction indicates that the Seychelles may potentially use the

2

nationality, passive personality, protective, and objective territorial principles of jurisdiction as
bases for jurisdiction in a new provision outlawing the financing of piracy.
Finally, while the international community largely supports the prosecution of piracy
suspects in the Seychelles, the lack of extradition treaties with some countries, especially
Somalia, may create problems in extraditing suspects to the Seychelles for prosecution.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Sources of Funding

Piracy has developed into a complex and lucrative economy that brings wealth not just to
the pirate crews. Following a successful piracy attack, ransom payments are distributed among
pirates, financiers, negotiators, and local village elders. One source estimates that financiers and
sponsors receive 50 percent of the ransom payment; the pirates, pirate commander, mothership
crew and attack squads split 30 percent; village elders receive 10 percent; and the security squad
(guns for hire to protect hostages and vessels) receives 10 percent.2 The United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) similarly reports that at least half of the total ransom paid goes
to those putting up the money to finance the operation.3 Others sources report that the figure is
as high as 70 percent.4
Thus, while the individuals who risk capture on a piracy expedition split one-third or less
of the ransom money, the bankrollers end up with more than half of the take. Financiers make a
large up-front cash investment, which they stand to lose if the pirate attack is unsuccessful.
Financiers provide the startup capital for pirate groups as well as non-cash assistance in the form
2

Rudolph Atallah, Pirate Financing: Understanding and Combating a Complex System, in CONFERENCE
ON GLOBAL CHALLENGE, REGIONAL RESPONSES: FORGING A COMMON APPROACH TO MARITIME POLICY 42, 43
(Stephen Brannon & Taufiq Rahim eds., 2011).
3
Awash With Money: Organized Crime and its Financial Links to Somali Piracy, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS
AND CRIME (May 25, 2011), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/May/awash-with-money---organizedcrime-and-its-financial-links-to-somali-piracy.html.
4
GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS AND LIVELIHOODS OFF THE COAST OF
SOMALIA, at iv (2011), available at http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/pub_1305229189_regular.pdf.
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of boats, fuel, and communication equipment.5 They also pay for the most expensive part of any
successful pirate attack: the maintenance of the hostage ship after it has been seized. Food and
water has to be supplied for the captives and their guards; local police need to be bribed; and fuel
has to be provided to power on-board generators.6 Pirate financiers will spend as much as
US$30,000 on a pirate crew that operates in the Indian Ocean and upwards of US$10,000 on
crews operating in the Gulf of Aden. To protect themselves and their operations, financiers pay
local militias as much as US$10,000 per month to protect them from sub-clan rivals or external
threats.7 Another source confirms that a piracy mission costs approximately US$30,000, and
adds that “you need to execute three or four missions to get lucky once.”8
To date, there is limited research that identifies who the financiers are, where they are
located, and where their piracy-derived wealth is invested. The deals between pirate crews and
their overseas financiers appear to be fairly informal, facilitated by extensive family or clan
networks. Some sources suggest domestic sources of funding for piracy, noting that capital
comes from “Somali warlords”9 and “local businessmen.”10 Others refer vaguely to “wealthy
individuals in the Middle East.”11 Most sources, however, point to the large Somali expatriate
community.12 For example, a 2008 Associated Press article reported that some of Canada’s
5

Elliot A. Anderson, It’s a Pirate’s Life for Some: The Development of an Illegal Industry in Response to
an Unjust Global Power Dynamic, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 319, 336 (2010).
6
Id. at 336–37.
7
Atallah, supra note 2, at 43.
8
Scott Carney, Cutthroat Capitalism: An Economic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Business Model, WIRED
MAG., July 13, 2009, available at
http://www.wired.com/images/multimedia/magazine/1707/Wired1707_Cutthroat_Capitalism.pdf (describing the
role of “financiers” in a “pirate organizational chart”).
9
Christopher Joyner, Navigating Troubled Waters Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism, 10 GEO. J.
INT’L AFF. 83, 85 (2009).
10
Carney, supra note 8.
11
Paul Cochrane, Treasure Ships: Somali Piracy and the Spectre of Money Laundering, BACK IN BEIRUT
(May 6, 2010), http://backinbeirut.blogspot.com/2010/05/treasure-ships-somali-piracy-and.html (noting that
maritime consultancy company Idarat Maritime Ltd. states that pirates “are believed to have received financial
support from wealthy individuals in the Middle East, seeking to make good returns in this business”).
12
14% of Somalis are living outside of Somali. See David Mugridge, Are Hawala Money Channels
Piracy's Achilles Heel?, THE NATIONAL (Apr. 26, 2011),
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200,000 Somalis “offer funds, equipment and information in exchange for a cut of the ransoms”
and that the network is “an open secret within the [Somali] community.”13 Another report
mentions the Somali expat communities in Yemen (which numbers 600,000), Kenya, the United
Arab Emirates, and Europe.14
A number of countries and organizations have recently set in motion efforts designed to
track down and disable pirate financing networks. The Seychelles is in the process of setting up
a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Centre (“Centre”).15 With the support of the
UK and the International Maritime Organization, the Centre will coordinate the tracking of
financial transactions and enforcement operations, thereby assisting law enforcement agencies to
build cases against the financiers of piracy.16 In addition, the UNODC, the World Bank, and
Interpol are coordinating on a joint report on illicit financial flows, which is expected to be
published at the end of 2012.17 In the United States, the Political Military Bureau of the State
Department has made tracking and disrupting piracy-related assets a priority in its anti-piracy
approach.18 Finally, Geopolicity, an international consulting firm, has prepared a thorough
framework for future research on the sponsorship of piracy as part of its report on the economic
and business models of piracy.19

(continued…)
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/are-hawala-money-channels-piracys-achilles-heel; see
also Carney, supra note 8.
13
Associated Press, Somali Pirates Get Help From Expats in Canada, THESTAR.COM (Dec. 11, 2008),
http://www.thestar.com/article/552023.
14
Mugridge, supra note 12.
15
Seychelles President, supra note 1.
16
Id.
17
Press Release, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Ransom Money Laundered by Pirates Affects Stability
in the Horn of Africa, Says UNODC Chief (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/February/ransom-money-being-laundered-by-pirates-affectsstability-in-the-horn-of-africa-says-unodc-chief.html.
18
Michael L. Baker, Smarter Measures in Fight Against Piracy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec.
10, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/smarter-measures-fight-against-piracy/p23611.
19
GEOPOLICITY, supra note 4.
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B.

Transmission of Funds

The current lack of information regarding the identity and location of pirate financiers is
largely a result of the difficulty in tracking piracy-related money transfers. Ransoms are
generally paid in cash, usually in US dollars, and often in bills of low denomination.20
Furthermore, the lack of a proper banking system in Somalia, which has not had an effective
government in almost twenty years, makes it difficult to trace even a very large influx of cash.
The illicit money is transferred by cash couriers, mobile phone money exchange services,
and by hawala, an informal value transfer system with origins in Islamic law.21 A hawala
operator accepts money on one end, then instructs a relative, friend or another agent in another
location to transfer a like amount to another party.22 The money is then laundered into
“legitimate” businesses throughout the Middle East, parts of Asia, and Africa. 23
After a cash ransom payment is made to a pirate crew, the money is typically broken
down into smaller units and distributed among various individuals.24 The money is then
transferred through hawala or by international carriers, predominantly nomadic Somalis,
carrying cash across Somalia’s porous borders.25 Sources suggest that the money then ends up in
the United Arab Emirates,26 Djibouti,27 Kenya,28 Tanzania,29 Uganda,30 Lebanon31 and Yemen.32
20

Cochrane, supra note 11.
Ademun Odeke, Somali Piracy: Effects on Oceanborne Commerce and Regional Security and
Challenges to International Law and World Order, 25 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR. L.J. 134, 144–45 (2011); see also
Hawala Channels Used to Fund Sea Piracy Ransom Ops: FATF, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Aug. 7, 2011, 10:26 AM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-07/news/29861435_1_ransom-money-hawala-alternativeremittance-systems (“The ‘hawala’ route of illegal money transactions is being used to pay ransom for rescuing ship
crews from pirates”); Mohammed El Qorchi et al., Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal
Hawala System (IMF-World Bank, Occasional Paper No. 222, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/222/index.htm (defining hawala as an “informal funds transfer system”).
22
Somali Piracy Backed by International Network, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 10, 2008, 6:59 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28158455/ns/world_news-africa/t/somali-piracy-backed-international-network/.
23
Atallah, supra note 2, at 44.
24
Odeke, supra note 21.
25
Id. at 144.
26
Tom Odula, Pirate Ransom Money May Explain Kenya Property Boom, HUFF. POST (Jan. 1, 2010, 3:47
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/02/pirate-ransom-money-kenya_n_409219.html. This claim has been
denied by Dubai and Emirates officials. However, Paul Cochrane reports that the United States Naval Institute
21
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Some of these countries have limited, if any, anti-money-laundering regimes,33 and some are on
the U.S. State Department’s list of money-laundering countries or countries vulnerable to the
practice.34 This means that a holder of cash—even in a large quantity—is often not required to
document it in any way.35 Large sums of piracy-derived cash can thus be exchanged openly in
the market.
It is thought that the ransom money is eventually invested in real estate, retail, long-haul
transport, and other legitimate businesses.36 The most notable impact has been in Kenya, where
Somalis have invested large sums of money in real estate over the last few years without visible
means of income and at a time of world recession.37 Property prices in Nairobi and Mombasa
have reportedly doubled or tripled in the last five to seven years, a pace that does not correlate
with the country’s economic performance.38 Indeed, one source has noted that “every taxi driver
in Nairobi can probably confirm that considerable sums [of ransom payments] are being invested
in the property market in Eastleigh—the Somali neighbourhood of Nairobi.”39
Finally, some of the ransom cash is inevitably used to conduct new pirate operations.
Following a successful attack, pirates and pirate financiers will often reinvest a portion of the
(continued…)
confirmed that the proceeds of Somali piracy have been deposited in accounts in Dubai. See Cochrane, supra note
11.
27
Odula, supra note 26.
28
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30
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32
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33
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Id. at 145.
37
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38
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39
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proceeds from the prior ransom into faster boats and improved equipment and weapons for future
ventures.40 UNODC also reports that “piracy money [is also] being reinvested into criminal
activities that are not linked to piracy,” meaning that the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and
alcohol, as well as human trafficking, also benefit from the piracy proceeds.41
III.

EXISTING LAW AND JURISDICTION
A.

Current Seychelles Law Available to Prosecute Financiers of Piracy

In 2010, the Seychelles amended Section 65 of its Penal Code to provide stricter penalties
for acts of piracy, punish inchoate acts of piracy, such as attempt and conspiracy, and expand
prosecution for acts of piracy to those who reside outside the Seychelles.
Section 65(1) states, “[a]ny person who commits any act of piracy within the Seychelles
or elsewhere is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of R1
million.42 Section 65(3) of the Penal Code was added to criminalize inchoate acts related to
piracy, stating that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit, or incites, aids and abets,
counsels or procures the commission of, an offence contrary to section 65(1) commits an offense
and shall be liable to imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of R1,000,000.”43 Thus, attempt,
conspiracy, incitement, and aiding and abetting acts of piracy are now clearly prohibited.
Further, in order to expand the scope of prosecution to accused pirates who had no
connection with the Seychelles, Section 65(2) of the Penal Code was added to provide for
40

Cochrane, supra note 11.
U.N. Press Release, supra note 17; see also Yury Fedotov, UNODC Briefing to Member States on
Somali Piracy (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2011/April/201104-12-somali-piracy.html.
42
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any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft; against a ship or an aircraft or a person or property in a place,
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universal jurisdiction44 over actual acts of piracy, stating that, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions
of section 65 and any other written law, the courts of the Seychelles shall have jurisdiction to try
an offence of piracy whether the offence is committed within the territory of Seychelles or
outside the territory of Seychelles.”45
Although it is not explicitly stated, Section 65(2) of the Code appears to provide
universal jurisdiction over both overt acts of piracy and acts of attempt, conspiracy, incitement,
and aiding and abetting.46 Further, Section 65(2) does not distinguish completed acts of piracy
from inchoate acts, stating only that the courts shall have jurisdiction “to try an offence of
piracy.”47 Given the broad language in Section 65(3), which allows for prosecution of, among
other things, acts of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, counseling, and procurement related to
piracy, this provision could potentially be used to prosecute acts of financing of piracy. For
example, financiers could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting piracy by providing funds and
weapons to pirates.
Despite the potential use of Section 65(3) to prosecute the financing of piracy, we
recommend that the Seychelles consider amending the Code to explicitly criminalize providing
material support for piracy. There are several reasons for our recommendation. First, as
discussed more fully in the next section of this memorandum, obtaining jurisdiction over nonnational financiers of piracy may be outside the scope of Section 65(2)’s grant of universal
jurisdiction. Second, having a discrete offense leaves no room for doubt that the Seychelles
prohibits the financing of piracy. Finally, providing a clear and supported jurisdictional basis for
financing piracy will better enable the Seychelles to enforce its new law, should it choose to
adopt it.
44

See infra, Section III.C (discussing universal jurisdiction).
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B.

Jurisdictional Bases for Prosecuting Piracy and the Financing of Piracy in
the Seychelles

In order to prosecute piracy and those who finance it, the Seychelles must have criminal
jurisdiction over the accused individuals. A state’s criminal jurisdiction refers to its authority
under international law to regulate the conduct of persons under its domestic laws.48 Under
international law, a state’s jurisdiction is generally confined to the limits of its territorial
sovereignty.49 Obtaining jurisdiction over conduct taking place outside a state’s territory, such
as the Seychelles’ desired jurisdiction over the financing of piracy, requires extraterritorial
authority.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction affords states an avenue to reach conduct outside a state’s
territorial sovereignty. International law currently recognizes five situations giving rise to
extraterritorial jurisdiction: (1) the crime occurs outside the state but has effects within the
territorial boundaries of the state (the “objective principle of jurisdiction”); (2) the crime was
committed by a state’s national outside the state (the “nationality principle of jurisdiction”); (3)
the crime is committed against a state’s nationals (the “passive personality principle of
jurisdiction”); (4) the crime has an impact on a state’s interests as a nation (the “protective
principle jurisdiction”); and (5) the crime is universally condemned (the “universality principle
of jurisdiction”).50 States have historically limited the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction because

48
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Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 735, 736
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some national interest).

10

it involves competing jurisdictional claims between states, which can seriously damage
diplomatic relations or result in trade boycotts and even armed conflict.51
C.

Universal Jurisdiction and Financing Piracy

Universal jurisdiction is distinct from the other four categories of extraterritorial
jurisdiction because it allows a state to invoke jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct of a
non-national despite the lack of a nexus between the state and the crime.52 It is based on the
nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
victim, or any other connection to the prosecuting state.53 While there is no generally accepted
definition for universal jurisdiction among the international community,54 the author Luc
Reydams has defined universal jurisdiction as existing, “where there is no link of territoriality or
nationality between the state and the conduct of the offender, nor is the state seeking to protect
its security or credit.”55
The generally accepted rationale behind universal jurisdiction is that certain crimes such
as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, are so harmful and universally
condemned that every state has a legal interest in their prosecution.56 Because such crimes
violate obligations owed to the international community as a whole, all states have the right to
51

Kontorovich, supra note 49, at 189.
See O’Keefe, supra note 48, at 745.
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59, 2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf.
54
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 165, ¶ 44. (Feb. 14) (dissenting
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55
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effects within its territory.” Id. at 745.
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exercise jurisdiction over the perpetrators, regardless of whether there is a nexus to the
prosecuting state.57 Historically, international support has existed for invoking universal
jurisdiction to prosecute acts of piracy given the nature of the crime, the fact that acts of piracy
are generally committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state, and that pirates are
generally considered “stateless” persons.58 Whether universal jurisdiction applies to acts
collateral to piracy, such as the financing of pirate operations, however, is a different issue.
Universal jurisdiction has been the subject of much contention among legal and academic
scholars, and there is little consensus regarding its current scope and application.59 In Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) addressed the scope of
universal jurisdiction based on a Belgian statute providing for universal jurisdiction over nonnationals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.60 Under color of the
statute, Belgium issued an arrest warrant against Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for the commission of war crimes.61
While the ICJ struck down the arrest warrant based on the issue of immunity,62 several of the
separate and dissenting opinions address the issue of universal jurisdiction.
The separate and dissenting opinions in the Arrest Warrant case reflect a narrow
interpretation of universal jurisdiction and demonstrate that the ICJ might likely strike down a
warrant based on universal jurisdiction where there exists no nexus between the Seychelles and

57
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the alleged financier.63 Indeed, as the separate opinion of President Guillaume states: “none of
[the existing international treaties] has contemplated establishing jurisdiction over offences
committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the
territory of the State in question. Universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to international
conventional law.”64 Further, after a review of national legislation and cases in numerous
countries, another separate opinion found no clear instance of the assertion of universal
jurisdiction without any additional jurisdictional link.65 In previous piracy cases prosecuted in
the Seychelles, the additional jurisdictional link has been the physical presence of the accused in
the Seychelles. To date, the pirates prosecuted have been seized on the high seas—by
Seychellois patrol vessels or those of other states—and subsequently transferred to the territorial
jurisdiction of the Seychelles.
Further, while universal jurisdiction is generally regarded as an appropriate basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over those who engage in acts of piracy,66 little support exists for invoking
universal jurisdiction over those who finance piracy.67 As shown by the Arrest Warrant case, the
use of universal jurisdiction remains controversial even in relation to serious international

63

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 35, ¶¶ 5, 9 (Feb. 14) (Separate
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crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.68 Indeed, the use of
universal jurisdiction has never been applied to proscribe acts of financing of a crime.69
Given the lack of support for the use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute the financing
of piracy under international law, the Seychelles would likely be unable to obtain custody of
non-national suspects transferring money exclusively within the territories of other countries and
bring them to trial in the Seychelles. As discussed more fully in Part III.F., below, the
Seychelles would need to acquire physical custody over the suspects through extradition or
informal transfer agreements. If an amended Seychelles Penal Code were to rely solely on
universal jurisdiction to criminalize the financing of piracy, a state would likely challenge an
extradition or transfer request. Therefore, we recommend that the Seychelles draft an additional
provision in its Penal Code that provides a jurisdiction basis for the financing of piracy that will
be more readily accepted under customary international law.
D.

Alternate Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Financiers of
Piracy

Given the issues with applying universal jurisdiction to non-national financiers who have
little or no connection to the Seychelles, we recommend the Seychelles consider providing an
alternative basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction for criminalizing the financing of piracy. As
discussed in Section III.B., above, international law recognizes four other bases for
extraterritorial jurisdiction in addition to universal jurisdiction. The most commonly accepted
basis, the “nationality principle,” allows a country to assert jurisdiction over the conduct of its
68

Id. at 120 (discussing the Arrest Warrant case and a law passed in Spain in 1985 that gave Spanish courts
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piracy). Notably, following international pressure, the Spanish government enacted amended legislation that limits
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own citizens, even when that conduct is committed outside the territory of the state.70 For
example, Argentine courts have jurisdiction over any Argentine citizen for any crime, including
those committed outside Argentina, if the citizen elects to be tried in Argentina in preference to
extradition, and British courts have jurisdiction over citizens who commit specific crimes abroad,
such as murder, bigamy and perjury.71 The nationality principle may also be used in the context
of business crimes, such as bribery and corruption.72 For example, in R v Hape, the Canadian
Supreme Court recently upheld the use of nationality jurisdiction in convicting a Canadian
citizen of money laundering in connection with an investment company in the Turks and Caicos
Islands.73
The “passive personality” principle of jurisdiction allows a state to assert jurisdiction
over the conduct of a non-national where the victim of such conduct is a national of the
prescribing state.74 This principle remains somewhat controversial, although it has gained
acceptance under international law and is used by a number of states, including Finland, Sweden,
France, and China.75 For example, Finnish and Swedish courts may exercise jurisdiction where
the victim is a private corporation or association registered in the state; Chinese courts have
jurisdiction over any crime committed against a Chinese citizen where the minimum penalty for
the crime is three years imprisonment; and French courts have jurisdiction over a crime
committee by a French or foreign national outside of France where the victim is a French
national at the time of the offense.76
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Notably, the Seychelles currently uses both the nationality and passive personality
principles in the jurisdictional provisions of its Prevention of Terrorism Act (“Terrorism Act”),
asserting jurisdiction where the person committing an offence under the Terrorism Act is a
citizen or resident of the Seychelles or if the offence is committed against a citizen of the
Seychelles.77 Given the previous usage of these jurisdictional bases in the Terrorism Act, the
uses of these bases will likely not be controversial in a similar provision of Section 65 of the
Penal Code.
Next, the protective principle of jurisdiction allows for prosecutions of acts which
threaten the national interests of the prosecuting country.78 Protective jurisdiction has
traditionally been used to prosecute offenses such as treason, counterfeiting, falsification of
official documents, perjury before consular officials, and conspiracy to violate immigration or
customs laws. Courts in the United States interpret the protective principle narrowly to require
that the conduct must “threaten the integrity of governmental functions that are generally
recognized as crimes by developed legal systems.”79 Other sources have noted that it is more
controversial than other bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction and “tends to be reserved for
conduct that poses a very serious threat to national security.”80
Although protective jurisdiction is relatively narrow, it may provide a jurisdictional basis
to the extent that pirate attacks have interfered with national functions and national security of
the Seychelles, such as the operation of ports or the effective functioning of the navy. Given the
proximity of the attacks to the Seychellois borders and the concern of Seychellois president for
establishing a “national security support system for Seychelles-based vessels,” as well as the
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recent agreement with China for increased military assistance in and around Seychelles,” the
assertion of jurisdiction based on the protection of national security is plausible.81
Finally, the “objective territorial” principle of jurisdiction, also known as the “effects”
doctrine, provides that jurisdiction can be asserted based on conduct occurring outside a country
that has effects within the country’s borders.82 As Internet and financial crimes crossing
international and electronic borders have become increasingly common, states have shown an
increased tendency to broaden the scope of their criminal jurisdiction by extending the principle
of territoriality to crimes which occur overseas but have an impact within the forum state.83
Objective territorial jurisdiction can provide a basis to legislate regarding conduct when some or
all of the conduct has been completed abroad so long as there is some conduct or effect within
the country.84
The United States has recognized the use of this principle to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign defendants in cases where U.S. commerce has been threatened by the
actions of a non-national in a foreign country. In United States v. Aluminum Company of
America (ALCOA),85 the U.S. government brought charges against a foreign consortium of
aluminum traders and producers who had affected the price of raw aluminum and goods
manufactured from aluminum in the U.S. through unfair trade practices of price fixing in
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violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.86 The court in ALCOA concluded that the agreement at
issue, although made abroad, was unlawful because it was intended to and did affect imports into
the U.S. The court stated that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends.”87 The court limited this “effects test,” however, by requiring a showing of a
direct and intended effect in the U.S.88
The extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was confirmed by the Supreme Court
in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California89 and extended to criminal prosecutions in United
States v. Nippon Paper Industrial Co.90 The effects doctrine has also been incorporated into
§402 of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which states, “a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . (c) conduct outside its territory that has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.”91
In light of both historical and recent use of the effects doctrine as a basis for
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Seychelles may be able to use this as a basis for prosecuting acts
of financing of piracy which occur outside the Seychelles but have an effect within the country.
Arguably, acts constituting financing and provision of material support to piracy could be
considered to have direct effects upon the economy of the Seychelles much in the same way that
price fixing affects the United States economy. As noted by Seychellois President Michel, the
nation has been adversely affected by piracy, costing it an average of 4 per cent of its GDP every
86
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year, which includes direct and indirect costs as well as losses in shipping, fishing, tourism and
increased spending on maritime security.92 President Michel notes that “between 2008 and 2010
there was a drop of 46 percent in local fishing, which is, coincidentally, also the equivalent of the
rise in the price of fish on the local market during the same period.”93 The costs of consumer
prices for imported goods have also increased due to an increase in the cost of importing. 94 All
of these rising costs affect the Seychellois economy and cost of living.95 Given the documented
impact of piracy upon the shipping, fishing, and tourism industries of the Seychelles, the
“effects” doctrine may offer a strong basis for jurisdiction over financiers of piracy. Further, this
basis of jurisdiction could be strengthened by inserting these or similar facts as legislative
findings as part of the amended provisions of the Penal Code.96
In sum, universal jurisdiction to prosecute financiers of piracy would likely not be
accepted by the international community. Thus, we recommend that the Seychelles consider
adopting a separate jurisdictional provision for outlawing the financing of piracy to provide for
jurisdiction based on the nationality, passive personality, protective, and objective territorial
principles of jurisdiction.
E.

Amending the Seychelles Penal Code to Explicitly Criminalize Financing of
Piracy

Given the problems identified with using universal jurisdiction as a basis for prosecuting
the financing of piracy, it is advisable to define the financing of piracy as a separate offense with
a separate basis of jurisdiction. Part 1 of this section outlines proposed language to amend
Section 65 of the Seychelles Penal Code. The proposed amendments set forth factual findings to
provide a basis for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, define financing of piracy and
92
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attempted financing of piracy as new and distinct crimes from the offenses of piracy, and provide
the jurisdictional bases for these new provisions. Part 2 of this section explains and discusses the
bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction and why it is recommended that the Seychelles consider
setting forth factual findings to bolster its assertion of jurisdiction over the financiers of piracy.
1.

Proposed Text

We recommend that the Seychelles consider amending Section 65 of the Seychelles Penal
Code in a manner to the following proposed text:97
65.(1) Finding that piracy and the support thereof is a serious problem
that threatens the vital national interests of Seychelles; that piracy
and the support thereof threatens commerce within Seychelles and
between Seychelles and foreign states by harming international
trade and market stability and by limiting international travel by
citizens of Seychelles and by citizens of foreign states to
Seychelles; that piracy and the support thereof threatens in
particular the fishing and tourist industries of Seychelles; that
support or resources for acts of piracy are often provided by
persons or entities residing or operating outside Seychelles;
and that it is necessary to deter and punish piracy and the support
thereof in order to protect the interests of Seychelles, any and all
acts of piracy, actions or omissions by persons or entities that
provide any form of support or resources to acts of piracy, and
attempts or conspiracies to engage in any such conduct, are
declared unlawful and are made subject to prosecution in
Seychelles as hereinafter set forth.98
65.(2) Any person who commits any act of piracy within Seychelles or
elsewhere is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for 30
years and a fine of R1 million.
65.(3) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit, or incites, aids
and abets, counsels or procures the commission of, an offence
97
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contrary to 65(2) commits an offence and shall be liable to
imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of R1 million.
65.(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 and any other written
law, the courts of Seychelles shall have jurisdiction to try an
offence under 65(2) or 65 (3), whether the offence is committed
within the territory of Seychelles or outside the territory of
Seychelles.
65.(5) Any person who, within Seychelles or elsewhere (1) knowingly
provides material support or resources for piracy, including
financing for or investment in piracy or (2) knowingly receives
material compensation or other benefits from acts of piracy,
commits an offence and shall be liable for imprisonment for 30
years and a fine of R1 million.
65.(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit, or incites, aids
and abets, counsels or procures the commission of, an offence
contrary to 65(5) commits an offence and shall be liable to
imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of R1 million.
65.(7) Notwithstanding the provision of section 6 and any other written
law, the courts of Seychelles shall have jurisdiction to try an
offense under sections 65(5) or 65(6) where the offence: (a) is
committed in whole or in part within Seychelles; or (b) is
committed, within Seychelles or elsewhere, by a citizen of
Seychelles or by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in
Seychelles; or (c) threatens, offends, or affects, within Seychelles
or elsewhere, the national interests of Seychelles as described in
section 65(1). The courts of Seychelles shall also have jurisdiction
to try an offense under sections 65(5) or 65(6) over any person,
within Seychelles or elsewhere, who conspires with or aids and
abets another person or entity over whom the courts of Seychelles
otherwise have jurisdiction under this section.
65.(8) [Former 65(4), piracy definition, re-numbered and placed here.]
65.(9) [Former 65(5), ship or aircraft definition, re-numbered and
placed here.]
65.(10) [Former 65(6), re-numbered and placed here.]
65.(11) [Former 65(7), re-numbered and placed here.]
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2.

Explanation of Proposed Text

The proposed amendment criminalizes knowingly providing material support for piracy
and knowingly receiving material compensation or benefits from acts of piracy.99 The
amendment also prohibits the inchoate offenses of attempt, conspiracy, incitement, aiding and
abetting, and counseling or procuring the commission of such an offense.100 Unlike the current
statute’s jurisdictional basis for acts of piracy,101 the proposed text does not confer universal
jurisdiction for offenses based on providing material support or receiving material compensation
for piracy.102
Instead, as discussed above, proposed Section 65.(7) provides for jurisdiction based upon
several alternative grounds: (a) territorial jurisdiction, including objective territorial, or “effects”
jurisdiction (the offence “is committed in whole or in part within Seychelles”); (b) the nationality
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the offence “is committed . . . by a citizen of Seychelles
or by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the Seychelles”); and (c) the protective
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the offence “threatens or offends, within Seychelles or
elsewhere, the national interests of Seychelles as described in Section 65(1)”).
As discussed in Section III.D. above, these provisions provide several alternate bases for
the prosecution of financiers of piracy which will likely be recognized under international law.
To aid recognition of these jurisdictional bases under international law, it is recommended the
Seychelles consider including legislative findings regarding the effects of piracy on its tourism,
fishing, and shipping industries, as well as its national security interests. By including
documented legislative findings about the negative effects of piracy upon the Seychellois
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economy such as those discussed by President Michel in his interview,103 proposed Section
65.7(a) provides for not only traditional territorial jurisdiction, but also objective territorial
jurisdiction.104 As discussed in Section III.D., above, this would allow for the prosecution of
those whose acts of financing or material support take place entirely outside the Seychelles.
Further, these legislative findings could also be used to bolster the assertion of jurisdiction based
upon the protective principle in Section 65.7(c). Given the narrow application of universal
jurisdiction and likely extradition issues discussed below, we recommend the Seychelles
consider this approach to amending the Seychelles Penal Code.105
F.

Enforcing the Penal Code Amendment

An amended penal code that provides for the prosecution of financiers of piracy cannot
be put to use until the suspects are physically present in the Seychelles. While the “front-line”
pirates are typically caught on the high seas and handed over to the Seychellois authorities for
prosecution, financiers of piracy will typically need to be arrested by another state’s law
enforcement and subsequently transferred to the Seychelles through processes of extradition or
diplomacy.
1.

The Extradition Process

Extradition is the official process whereby a state surrenders a suspected or convicted
criminal to help another state enforce its criminal law. The person is surrendered to face trial
before a criminal court in the requesting state, or to serve a sentence already imposed.
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Extradition applies only in the context of criminal law; it is not available for the purpose of
enforcing other parts of the law, such as administrative or disciplinary provisions.106
Between states, extradition is regulated by bilateral treaties. Extradition treaties spell out
the conditions under which countries may entertain or deny extradition requests. Because every
state has jurisdiction over the persons within its borders, a state has no obligation to surrender an
alleged criminal to a foreign state in the absence of an applicable extradition treaty. The desire
of states to be able to demand the extradition of criminals taking refuge in other countries has
lead to the evolution of a web of extradition treaties. Today, most countries in the world have
executed extradition treaties with other countries, but no country in the world has an extradition
treaty with all other countries.107
An extradition treaty will typically require that the crime involved is serious, that there
exists sufficient evidence for the prosecution against the wanted individual, or that the person to
be extradited has been convicted under conditions of due process of law.108 Another common
provision is the “dual criminality” principle, which requires that the alleged act be a crime in
both the requesting and requested states.109 Some treaties require the punishment be
proportionate to the crime.110 Most countries reject extradition requests based on political
crimes, and some countries decline extradition on grounds that the person, if extradited, may
receive capital punishment or face torture.111 It is also quite common for states to refuse to
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extradite their own nationals, choosing instead to prosecute them “at home.”112 Further, some
treaties include the principles of double jeopardy and ne bis in idem, meaning that extradition
may be denied by the requested state if the requested person is or has already been subject to
judicial proceedings on the basis of the offense.113
Once the requesting state requests the arrest and extradition of an accused or convicted
person, the requested state institutes proceedings to execute the request. In most states, both the
executive and the judiciary branches have a role to play in the proceeding: a court considers the
formal requirements, and the actual surrender of the suspect is an executive decision.114
Extradition will typically be denied if the terms of the applicable treaty are not met.115
2.

Extraditing Pirate Financiers to the Seychelles

As discussed above, acquiring the physical presence of alleged financiers is necessary for
their prosecution in the Seychelles. The threshold issue in each prosecution will be whether
extradition treaties exist between the Seychelles and the countries where pirate financiers
reside.116 If an extradition treaty exists, the Seychellois prosecutor must send the country a
request for the suspect’s arrest and extradition to the Seychelles. While the outcome of such a
request will depend on the terms of the treaty, issues that may arise include the following:
1) If the treaty incorporates the dual criminality principle, the definition of the
offense underlying the extradition request becomes very important. While piracy
is a crime in most jurisdictions, financing of piracy may not be. Under the dual
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criminality principle, if the accused could not be prosecuted in the requested state
for the crime specified in the extradition request, the request may be denied.
2) If the accused is a national of the requested state, it is possible that the requested
state will choose to refuse extradition and instead prosecute the accused in its own
courts. Notably, Somalia has shown signs of espousing this attitude: In January
2012, the Somali ambassador to the UN spoke out against the prosecution in the
United States of a man accused of serving as a lead negotiator in a 2011 pirate
attack that killed four U.S. citizens. The ambassador claimed that Somalia was
both willing and able to handle the prosecution.117
3) A requested state may also be hesitant to extradite financiers of piracy to the
Seychelles if the prosecution of the crime is based on a claim of universal
jurisdiction. While there is support in international statutory and customary law
for universal jurisdiction over piracy, such jurisdictional claims are not
unanimously accepted where the crime has no nexus to the prosecuting state.118
If an extradition treaty does not exist, the Seychelles can still make a request for the
accused to be transferred, but the state receiving the request has no obligation to consider or
comply with that request. In such cases, the outcome is most likely determined by the diplomatic
and political relationship between the Seychelles and the requested state, as well as the requested
state’s perspective on and role in international counter-piracy efforts.
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Assuming that no extradition treaty exists between the Seychelles and Somalia,119
achieving the transfer of suspected financiers located in Somalia may be particularly difficult.
First, as mentioned above, the recent claim by the Somali ambassador to the UN that Somalia is
both willing and able to bring pirates to justice in its national courts suggests that the country
would be disinclined to acquiesce to a request to send suspected financiers to the Seychelles for
prosecution. Second, Somalia has been without any effective internal political structure or
national government for more than two decades, and it does not have a national military or an
effective police force.120 Therefore, even if a Somali government or quasi-government actor
agreed to track down, arrest, and transfer a suspected pirate financier to the Seychelles, law
enforcement capacity may not be sufficient to effect such a transfer.
Financiers of piracy are likely to be tracked down not only in Somalia, from where
extradition may be difficult, but also in Kenya, Yemen, the UAE, and Western countries. If
extradition treaties do not exist between the Seychelles and these countries, the outcome of a
request to arrest and transfer a suspect is a matter of diplomacy and politics. On the one hand, it
is possible that some of these countries would deny such requests and opt instead to prosecute in
their own courts. On the other hand, considering the international support for the Seychelles’
counter-piracy efforts to date, it may be equally possible that countries will comply with such
requests.
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It is worth noting that the Seychelles has received praise and support for its efforts to
bring “front-line” pirates to justice. In 2010, the UN Security Council commended the efforts of
Kenya and Seychelles to prosecute suspected pirates and asked that other international entities
assist these countries.121 Similarly, a U.S. State Department spokesperson recently stated that
“[w]e appreciate the Seychelles’ regional leadership on counter-piracy, as seen in their
willingness to prosecute and incarcerate Somali pirates.”122 The Seychelles has signed
memoranda of understanding regarding the transfer of suspected pirates with the governments of
Demark, the United Kingdom, and the United States; it seems reasonable that these countries
would be similarly inclined with respect to suspected financiers.
The authors of a recent U.K. parliamentary report “welcome[d] the [U.K.] Government’s
new initiative for a centre based in the Seychelles to focus on pirate financiers.”123 In a similar
vein, the U.S. assistant secretary for political-military affairs stated before Congress that “we
intend to work with our international partners . . . to go after the smaller number of criminal
conspirators who provide the leadership and financial management of the pirate enterprise, with
the objective of bringing them to trial.”124 Such statements suggest that the Seychelles’ efforts to
target financiers, and any related suspect-transfer requests, may be well received by other states
and the international community at large.
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IV.

Conclusion
This memorandum provides recommendations for consideration by the Seychelles to

effectively prosecute and eliminate the cycle of piracy, ransom, and reward that has continued to
escalate off the coast of Somalia in recent years. While the international community clearly
supports the Seychelles in its efforts to successfully prosecute and punish both pirates and those
who finance piracy, such efforts must still occur within the boundaries of international norms of
criminal jurisdiction. Based upon recent cases decided by the ICJ, international law likely will
not support using universal jurisdiction to prosecute acts related to the financing of piracy.
Rather, using alternative bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction will be most effective in
prosecuting financiers of piracy under Seychellois law. To this end, our recommendations for
how the Seychelles Penal Code may be amended to prosecute financiers of piracy who reside
outside of the Seychelles is our best assessment of the various means the Seychelles may choose
to consider in order to successfully reach non-residents who provide material support to piracy.
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